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# Leaked Document Suggests Cellebrite Can Wirelessly Exploit iPhones
- URL: https://www.privacyguides.org/news/2026/10/19/leaked-document-suggests-cellebrite-can-wirelessly-exploit-iphones/
- Published: 2026-10-19T17:13:00.000Z
- Updated: 2026-10-19T20:17:20.000Z
- Description: A user on a blog post claims to have been sent a leaked Cellebrite document marked "confidential" explaining their new capabilities, including exfiltrating data from iPhones using a dedicated device from a range of 8 meters.
- Author: Fria Reyes
- Tags: News Briefs

A user on a [blog post](https://justin.sh/blog/2026/10/cellebrite-advanced-unlocks/) claims to have been sent a leaked Cellebrite document marked "confidential" explaining their new capabilities, including exfiltrating data from iPhones using a dedicated device from a range of 8 meters.

Forensics companies like Cellebrite are infamous for their devices which exploit iPhones to extract personal data when they aren't provided with a password. These companies typically keep their advanced exploits secret instead of responsibly disclosing them, since their products rely on device manufacturers being unaware of the flaws in order for Cellebrite's products to keep working.

Previously, non-public documents from Cellebrite have [leaked](https://www.404media.co/someone-snuck-into-a-cellebrite-microsoft-teams-call-and-leaked-phone-unlocking-details/), confirming their capabilities at the time. Generally, iPhones and Google Pixels fared the best, with GrapheneOS being the most resilient.

![](https://www.privacyguides.org/content/images/2026/10/image-1.png)

Credit: [justin.sh](https://justin.sh/blog/#fn:1)

This document states that "many labs are increasingly shut out of accessing critical digital evidence on the latest iOS devices." Apple has been releasing new features like automatic restart to put iPhones back into the more secure Before First Unlock (BFU) mode and controls for allowing USB accessories to connect that make attacking iPhones more difficult.

The Cellebrite document promises that their new "Advanced Unlocks" feature will provide a future-proof way for law enforcement to unlock iPhones in AFU mode. What exactly makes it "future-proof" isn't clear, but they say it "mitigates the risk of sudden lockouts from future iOS updates."

A public [press release](https://web.archive.org/web/20260814034529/https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cellebrite-appoints-shiven-ramji-chief-executive-officer-succeeding-thomas-e-hogan-302850249.html) corroborates that Cellebrite has a feature called "Advanced Unlocks."

AU uses a single, dedicated appliance and has a range of about 8 meters, implying the device is wireless although it's not explicitly stated. It also says it "separates access from extraction," implying the means of exploitation is different than over the USB port that they typically use.

They made AU available on a "limited basis," presumably because they don't want one of the devices getting into the hands of a security researcher like what happened before when the creator of Signal found a Cellebrite device that had [fallen off a truck](https://signal.org/blog/cellebrite-vulnerabilities/).

The blogger says that AU supports iPhones 11-16, conspicuously leaving out the iPhone 17 and up. With these devices, Apple released a new hardware security capability called [Memory Integrity Enforcement](https://security.apple.com/blog/memory-integrity-enforcement/), which provides protection against memory safety vulnerabilities, one of the "leading causes of vulnerabilities in memory-unsafe codebases" according to [Google](https://research.google/pubs/secure-by-design-googles-perspective-on-memory-safety/).

It's not clear if this is the explicit reason for excluding the latest iPhones, but MIE likely makes any exploit chain involving memory safety vulnerabilities more difficult.